Carnegie Mellon University

Pegasus: A Framework for Sound Continuous Invariant Generation

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Outline

Introduction: Formal Verification for CPS

Background: Continuous Invariants and Checking

Pegasus: A Framework for Sound Continuous Invariant Generation

Conclusion

What this talk is about



Formal verification for cyber-physical systems (CPS)

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Discrete computational controllers interacting with continuous real-world physics, modeled as hybrid systems

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Formal verification for cyber-physical systems (CPS)

Mathematics-based tools & techniques providing rigorous guarantees for computer systems

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Formal verification for cyber-physical systems (CPS)


Mathematics-based tools & techniques providing rigorous guarantees for computer systems

Discrete computational controllers interacting with continuous real-world physics, modeled as hybrid systems

Why? Need rigorous & exhaustive proofs for these safety-critical systems Alongside nonexhaustive simulation, field testing, and other validation methods

CPS Verification Tools

Reachability analysis: Automatic, but overapproximate and limited to bounded space and time




CPS Verification Tools

Reachability analysis: Automatic, but overapproximate and limited to bounded space and time 4 .3 0 **Deductive theorem proving:** More general specifications & proof techniques, but offers less automation Base case 4 EUse case 5 Induction step 6 x>0 ⊢ ': [x:=x+1; ∪ {x'=v}] x≥0 [u] [aub]P⇔[a]P∧[b]P -2 v>0 - loop x>0.v>0 $[{x:=x+1: \cup {x'=y}}^*] x>0$ H

CPS Verification Tools

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


Deductive theorem proving: More general specifications & proof techniques, but offers less automation

Base case 4		Use case 5		E Induction step 6
⊖ loop -	 ·1: x≥0 ·2: v≥0 	⊢ '	[x:=x+1; ∪ {x'=v}] x≥0	[u] [a ∪ b] P ↔[a]P∧[b]P
	x≥0,v≥0	⊢	[{x:=x+1; ∪ {x'=v}}*] x	≥0

Continuous invariants:

Set of states that can never be left when following the continuous dynamics



CPS Verification Tools

Reachability analysis:

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
imations and (sometimes) extend analyses to infinite time horizons

Deductive theorem proving: More general specifications & proof techniques, but offers less automation

■ Base case 4 ■ U/case 5 ■ Induction step 6 Invariants are key ingredients in ODE safety proofs and part of hybrid system loop invariants

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Introduction CPS Verification Tools




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This work: *Pegasus* continuous invariant generator & sound integration with KeYmaera X, a hybrid systems theorem prover




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
Invariants in Discrete Systems



Claim: System cannot reach **bad** state(s) from the initial state(s). **Justification:** The invariant is closed under the system's discrete transitions.

Idea: Proving safety for system reduces to finding a suitable invariant

Invariants in Continuous Systems




Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs)

States: $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ Dynamics: $\vec{x}' = f(\vec{x})$

Trajectories of the system (in green) are solutions of the ODE from an initial state

Invariants in Continuous Systems



Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs)

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Trajectories of the system (in green) are solutions of the ODE from an initial state

Claim: System cannot reach bad state(s) from the initial state(s). **Justification:** The invariant is closed under the system's **continuous** dynamics

Idea: Proving safety for **continuous** systems reduces to finding suitable **continuous** invariants

Checking Continuous Invariants

Checking whether a (polynomial arithmetic) formula defines a continuous invariant is **decidable** (Liu, Zhan & Zhao, EMSOFT 2011).




Checking Continuous Invariants

Checking whether a (polynomial arithmetic) formula defines a continuous invariant is **decidable** (Liu, Zhan & Zhao, EMSOFT 2011).



Differential dynamic logic dL is **sound and complete** for proving continuous invariance (Platzer & Tan, LICS 2018).





Introduction: Formal Verification for CPS


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Pegasus Overview

This work: Sound and automated continuous invariant generation with Pegasus




Pegasus (implemented in Wolfram Language) has:

- ▶ a simple continuous safety verification problem **classifier**
- ▶ invariant generation **primitive** methods and **strategies** for combining them
- proof hints for sound invariant checking in KeYmaera X

Qualitative analysis

Idea: Perform discrete abstraction using heuristics & other sources in the input problem (using LZZ to test the transition relation)




Some sources of predicates:

- ▶ right-hand sides of ODEs, their factors, etc.
- functions defining the pre/postcondition and domains
- physically meaningful quantities (e.g. divergence of the vector field)

First integrals and Darboux polynomials

Idea: Find conserved quantities of the continuous system

Functions p such that p' = 0 (i.e. the rate of change of p w.r.t. the ODEs is 0)




Techniques:

- ▶ Polynomial first integrals (of bounded degree) can be generated using linear algebra
- **Darboux polynomials** $p' = \alpha p$, for polynomial α (gen. with computer algebra techniques)
- **Rational functions** $p = \frac{q}{r}$, for polynomials q, r (combine Darboux poly. and lin. algebra)

Barrier certificates

Idea: find a continuous invariant $p \le 0$ numerically (Prajna and Jadbabaie, HSCC 2004) Generalizes to vector barrier certificates (our work, FM 2018)




Techniques:

- ▶ differential inequalities, e.g. $p' \leq 0$, $p' \leq \lambda p$ ($\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$), and
- **sum-of-squares decomposition** (via semidefinite programming)
- ► linear programming relaxations


Differential saturation

Idea: Iteratively refine the candidate invariant by cycling through primitive methods until saturation or a suitable invariant is found



Differential saturation


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• Refinement 1 (using a Darboux polynomial: $x_1 > 0$)

Differential saturation


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- Refinement 1 (using a Darboux polynomial: $x_1 > 0$)
- Refinement 2 (using qualitative analysis $x_1 > 0 \land x_2 > 0$)

Differential saturation


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- Refinement 1 (using a Darboux polynomial: $x_1 > 0$)
- Refinement 2 (using qualitative analysis $x_1 > 0 \land x_2 > 0$)
- ▶ Refinement 3 (using a barrier certificate $x_1 > 0 \land x_2 > 0 \land p \le 0$) $p = \frac{3}{8}x_1 + \frac{23}{56}x_1^2 - \frac{123}{56}x_2 + \frac{3}{14}x_1x_2 + \frac{29}{28}x_2^2 - 1$


Differential divide-and-conquer

Idea: Divide state space using an equational invariant p = 0, and find suitable invariants for each partition recursively




- ▶ State space is partitioned into regions $x_1 < 0$, $x_1 = 0$, $x_1 > 0$, which have no transitions between them
- ▶ For $x_1 \leq 0$, no unsafe states, so the trivial invariant suffices
- ▶ For $x_1 > 0$, a barrier certificate separates initial from unsafe states


Benchmark suite of **150** continuous safety verification problems drawn from the literature Variety of benchmarks: 2–16 dim, (non-)linear ODEs, syntactic complexity, topology, etc.




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More extensive experiments & results in paper:

- Summary: 107/150 solved automatically, DS strategy is highly effective at combining invariant generation primitives
- Various configuration parameters for differential saturation
- Effect of proof hints on sound invariant checking for KeYmaera X

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
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
Thank you for your attention!






Pegasus is an **effective** and **sound** continuous invariant generator for hybrid systems verification

http://pegasus.keymaeraX.org




Handling Invariants

Design choices in proof assistants



Less soundness-critical code



Using external oracles

(Untrusted, but checked) proof using tactics

Discrete abstraction

Idea: Partition \mathbb{R}^n into discrete states S_1, \ldots, S_k defined by some predicates & compute the discrete transition relation in the resulting abstraction

